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Operative Gift and Bequest Motives
ABSTRACT
TheRicerdlonEquivalenceTheorem, which is the proposition that changes in the timing of
lump-sum taxes have no effect on consumption or capital accumulation, dependson the existence
of operative altruistic motives for Intergenerational transfers. These transferscan ha bequests
from parents to children or gifts from children to parents. In order for theRicardlan
Equivalence Theorem to hold, one of these transfer motives must he operative In thesense that
the level of the transfer Isnot determinedby a corner solution resulting from a binding
non-negativity constraint This paper derives conditions that determine whether the bequest
motive willbeoperative, the giftmotivewill be operative, or neither motive willhe operative
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In a pioneering paper, Barro (1 974) demonstrated that ifconsumers have operative
altruistic bequest motives, then a reduction in lump-sum taxesaccompanied by the issue of an
equal amount of government bonds has no effect on the eflocation ofresources. Berro stressed
that this result, which has come to be known as the PicardianEquivalence Theorem, requires
that the bequest motive be operative. In this context, the term"operative" means that
equilibrium bequests are determined by tangencij conditions rather thanby corner solutions
such as meg arise from binding non-negativity constraints. If thebequest motive is not
operative, then the Ricardian equivalence result presented by Barro does not hold and thereare
important effects associated with the governments choice between debt finance andtaxes.
More recently, Buiter (1 979) and Carmichael (1 982) haveanalyzed the altruistic gift
motive in which consumers obtain utility from the utility of theirparents and thus may be
motivated to give resources to their parents. Their analyses confirm Barro'sclaim (p. 11 04)
that if the gift motive is operative, then the PicardianEquivalence Theorem holds. If the gift
motive is not operative, then the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem fails to hold.
Because the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem depends on anoperative motive for private
intergenerational transfers, it is important to determine the conditions under whicheither
transfer motive will be operative. Severalpapers have studied whether the bequest motive is
operative in a variety of different models1 but the literature does not containan analysis of the
conditions that determine whether the gift motive is operative. In thispaper, I will study the
conditions for an operative gift motive. However, rather than confine theanalysis to a model in
which consumers have only a gift motive, I will assume that individualconsumers have
two—sided transfer motives. That is, I will assume that individualconsumers have both a gift
motive and a bequest motive as in Burbidye (1 983), Buiter and Carmichael(1 984) and2
Burbidge (1 984).2 In the steady state equilibrium, the gift motive may be operative, the
bequest motive may be operative, or neither motive may be operative. If either of the
intergenerational transfer motives is operative, then the Picardian Equivalence Theorem holds;
however, if neither motive is operative, then changes in the timing of lump—sum taxes have
important effects on the intertemporal and intergenerational allocation ofresources.3
The major goal of this paper is to determine conditions under which each of the
intergenerational transfer motives is operative if individual consumers have two- sided transfer
motives. As a prerequisite to this analysis, I will discuss, in section I, appropriate restrictions
on the gift motive and the bequest motive. In section II, I will discuss the restrictions on
two-sided transfer motives implied by intergenerational consistency. The specification of the
motives for intergenerational transfers has important implications for a wide range of issues
extending betjond the effects of fiscal policy, including the intergenerational transmission of
inequality' and for the behavior of financial markets, especially markets for life insurance and
annuities.5 In section III I discuss the endogenous determination of equilibrium factor prices
end then describe the steady state equilibrium. The conditions under which one or the other of
the transfer motives is operative are derived in section IV. Concluding remarks are presented
in section V.
I. A Two-Sided Transfer Motive
In this section I present a two-sided transfer motive and discuss appropriate restrictions on
the parameters of the transfer motive. Consider a representative consumer economy in which
each consumer lives for two periods. A generation t consumer is born at the beginning of period
t,consumesc1inperiodtatage1 andconsumesc211 inperiodt+1 atage2. Let ut=
u(c1 t,c2t÷ 1 ) be the utility that a generation t consumer obtains directly from his own
consumption. Defining ult as u(c1 t,c2t+ 1 )/c1t and as Ou(c1 t,c2t÷ 1 )/ac2t÷ 1'
assume that ult > 0, 1 > 0 end that Uit(O,) = oo = i (,0). Also, assumethat u(;)3
is strictly concave and thatCit and c2t+ are normal goods.
In addition to obtaining utility directly from his ownconsumption, a generation t consumer
obtains utilitity from the consumption of his parents and from theconsumption of all of his
descendents. In particular, I will use the Buiter-Carmichael( 1 984)generalization of the
Burbidge( I 983) two-sided utility function
Ut + aut_l + PJut+j (1)
j= 1
The parameter measures the strength of the bequest motive andsatisfies the restriction 0 ￿
< 1. The assumption that must be less than one is the standardassumption in the literature6
and is necessary and sufficient for the transvers&ity condition tohold in the steady state with
constant per capita consumption. The nonnegative parametera measures the strength of the gift
motive. There is no compelling reason to restrict a to be less than one.7'8I will show in
section II that intergenerational consistency (defined below)places en upper bound on the
admissable values of a, but depending on the value of , thisupper bound may be greater than,
equal to, or less than one.
The two—sided utility function in (1) nests both the one-sided altruisticbequest motive and
the one—sided altruistic gift motive. The one-sided altruisticbequest motive is often specified
recursively as
Vt = Ut + Pvt+i (2)
When a=0, the utility function in (1) is consistent with therecursively specified altruistic
bequest motive in (2).
The one—sided gift motive is often specified recursively asVt = Ut + t- 1 which can be
rewritten as
Vt = ut + aut_l + a2vt_2
From the point of view of the generation t consumer with theone-sided gift motive in (3), the
utility of his granarent, t2 is fixed; mcimization of the utility function in (3)is4
equivalent to maximization of the utility function in(1) when = 0. Thus, the utility function
in (1) nests the one-sided altruistic bequest motive end theone-sided altruistic gift motive.10
Before presenting the consumers budget constraint, it is necessaryto describe the
demographic composition of dynastic families. Each consumerlives for two periods and has
n1 children at the beginning of the second period of his life.This assumption follows the
standard convention of ignoring the fact that it takes two people fromdifferent families to
produce children. In the model, each consumer has n children and has oneparent.12
Let g be the gift given by a generation t consumer to his parentwho is a generation t- 1
consumer. This gift is made during period t wIis the only period during which both
generations are alive. Because the generation t consumerhas one parent and n children, this
consumer gives a gift ofin period t and receives gifts totalling n g11.in period t+ 1.
Let b1 be the bequest given by a generation t consumer to eachof his n children (generation
t+ 1 consumers) in period t+ 1. The generation t consumerreceives a bequest b1_ 1 from his
parent in period 1. In addition to receiving the bequest b1. 1in period t, the generation t
consumer inelastically supplies one unit of labor in periodt and receives the real wage rate wt
in period t. The generation t consumer is retired in period 1+1. Letting Rt+ 1 be the gross rate
of return on saving held from period t to period t+ 1 , the budgetconstraint of a representative
period I consumer is
(cit+gOPt+i + C.f
+rtbt = Iwt + bt_iIRt+i + ng+ (4)
The left hand side of (4) contains the generation t consumerS expenditureon his own
consumption in the two periods of his life plus the expenditure onbequests to children and a gift
to his parent. The right hand side of (4) contains the three sourcesof the generation t
consumers resources labor income, bequest receivedfrom his parent and the gifts received
from his children.
I use the standard Nash assumption that in choosing optimal valuesof consumption,
bequests, and gifts, the consumer takes as given theactionsof all other members of his dgnastic5
family. In particular,inchoosingthe generation t consumer takes as given the gifts given by
his siblings to their common parent. The maximization problem of a representative generation
t consumer is to maximize (1) subject to (4), the non- negativity constraints 13g1 0 and bt
￿ 0 and subject to the given values of the decisions of all other members of the dynastic family.
Recalling that u1 and u2t+ 1 are the derivatives of u1(c1 t,c2t+1 ) with respect to its first and
second arguments, respectively, the first-order conditions are
=
P1.11 u2141 (5)
u1 a u2 (holds with equality if g1 > 0) (6)
￿ (a/n) u1 1(holds with equality if bt > 0) (7)
Equation (5) characterizes the optimal intertemporal allocation of the consumer's own
consumption over his lifetime, If the consumer reduces cit by one unit he suffers a utility loss
of u1 However, if this unit of the consumption good is saved, thenc2 1+ i can be increased by
1 units which increases utility by t+ 1 u2 t i At the optimum, the utility loss in period t
is equated to the utility gain in period t+ 1 ,as indicated by (5).
Equation (6) characterizes the optimal gift g1. In period 1, the generation 1 consumer can
reduce his own consumption by one unit, suffering a utility loss ofult, end can increase the gift
g1 by one unit, increasing his parent's utility by u21. The increase in parent's utility raises the
generation t consumer's utility by a u2t. If the optimal gift is at an interior optimum(g > 0),
then the utility loss (u1 t from the reduction inc11 will equal the utility gain (a u2t) from the
increased gift. If, at = 0, the utility loss from reduced consumption exceeds theutility gain
from an increased gift, then the consumer will not make a positive gift, and thenon-negativity
constraint on the gift binds strictly. It is worth noting that if, for some unspecifiedreason,
siblings jointly decide on the level of the gift to give to their common parent, or equivalently, if
each consumer is assumed to have 1 /n parents, then the first-order condition (6) must be
amended to
ult a n u2 (holds with equality if> 0) (6')6
Equation (6) corresponds to the first-order condhon derived by Carmichael(1982)and is
consistent with the conditions in Buiter and Carmichael (1 984).
Equation (7) characterizes the optimal bequest bt. The generation t consumer can reduce
c2 t+ by one unit end increase the bequest to eachchild by 1 In, which increases the utility of
each child by (1 /n)u1 If theuest motive is operative (bt > 0), then the utility loss
from decreased consumption is equal to the utility gain from increasing the bequest. If the
non—negativity constraint binds strictly, then the inequality in (7) holds strictly.
II. I nteraenerational Consistencu under a Two— Sided Motive
In this section I discuss the conditions under which the decisions of different generations
within a family are "intergenerationally consistent." There are two aspects of intergenerational
consistency. First, there is the notion of dynamic consistency introduced by Strotz (1 956).
Strotz showed that for a particular formulation of the intertemporal utility function in which
the discount factor between two periods depends only on the length of time between the two
periods, and not on calender time, the consumption plan will be dynamically inconsistent unless
the discount factors are geometrically declining. In the context of the utility function in (1), it
is important that the weights on ut+ are geometrically declining for j=0,1 ,2If these
weights were not geometrically declining, then the consumption plan would suffer from dynamic
inconsistency in Strotzs sense, if the bequest motive were operative.
The second notion of intergenerational consistency isthat the first-order conditions of
parents and their children should not contradict each other. More precisely, consider the
first—order condition characterizing the optimal gift from a child to a parent at time t
(equation(6)) and the first—order condition characterizing the optimal bequest from a parent to
a child at time t (equation (7) with the time subscript decremented by 1). If both of these first
order conditions are to hold, then
￿ au2 (1/n)ult (8)7
Beceu i t i .umed to be positive, equation (8) implies that
a ￿ n (9)
Equation (9) along with the restrictions 0 ￿ < 1 end a ￿ 0 describe the adrnissable values of
the parameters a and under the restriction that the two-sided transfer motive is
intergenerational ly consistent.
Ill. Cornoetitive FactorPricesand Steedu State EQuilibrium
n the previous sections analyzed the behavior of an individual dynastic familytaking as
given the factor prices wt and R. These factor prices, which are determined endogenously in
competitive factor markets, depend on the productive technology. Let Vt be gross output in
period 1. This output is hornogenous and can either be consumed or used as capital in the
following period. The level of output is determined by a neoclassical linearly homogeneous
production function t= N1) where Kt is the aggregate stock of capital and Nt is the
number of young consumers who each supply one unit of labor. The production function F(, ) is
a gross production function in the sense that the aggregate capital stock,K. 1 is equal to
output, Y1, minus total consumption, N1 c11 + N1_ 1c2t, in period t. The production function can
be written in intensive form as y = f(k) where y is the output- labor ratio, k is the
capital—labor ratio, f > Oandf" <0.
In competitive factor markets, each factor is paid its marginal product
= R(k)f'(k1) (10)
wt = w(k1) f(k) — ktf (k1) (11)
The steady state is characterized by constant values of consumption for bothyoung consumers
and old consumers. Therefore, ult andu21 are each constant in the steady state. Equations (5)
- (7) imply that in the steady state the interest rate R must satisfy the following condition
a Rc n/ (12)
If one of the transfer motives is operative, then the steady state interest rate is atone of the8
boundaries in (12). In particular,
R= n/ ifb>O (13a)
P =a ifg>O (13b)
Srnce is restricted to be less than one, equation (1 3e) yields the well—known result that a
steady state with operative bequests is undercapitalized relative to the Golden Rule (i.e., R>n).
However, since a can be less than, greeter then, or equal to n, equation (1 3b) implies that a
steady state with an operative gift motive can be either overcapitalized, undercapitalized, or at
the Golden Rule. This result is contrary to the result in Carmichael (1 982) that a steady state
with an operative gift motive is overcapitalized. Carmichael's overcapitelization result follows
from his assumption that the gift parameter a must be less than one and from his implicit
assumption that siblings jointly determine the gifts to their common parent according to (6').
Under this pair of assumptions P = na < n in the steady state with operative gifts.
Finally, observe from (1 3a,b) that if a n, then either bequests or gifts must be equal to
zero in the steady state. In the case with a = n, which is on the boundary of the acknissable
region of the parameter space, end which corresponds to Burbidge's specification1 ', it is
possible for both gifts end bequests to be positive in the steady state. However, as shown below
in section IV, the direction of net intergenerational transfers will be determinate in this case.
Also note that with cif5 = n, the range of possible values for the steady state interest rate in (1 2)
is degenerate the steady state interest rate is equal to n/ = a regardless of the level of
government debt which is serviced by lump-sum taxes. Finally, since at least one of the
transfer motives is operative, the Picardien Equivalence Theorem holds in this case, as argued
by Burbidge.
IV. When Are the Transfer Motives Ooerative?
The neutrality of government debt requires that one of the transfer motives is operative
both before and after the change in government debt, and, furthermore, that the same motive is9
operative after the change as before the change. Since the Picardian Equivalence theorem rests
on the existence of an operative transfer motive, the question of when one of the transfer
motives will be operative takes on great importance. In this section, I extend Weils (1 987)
analysis of the one—sided bequest motive in (2) to the case of the two-sided utility function in
(1).
Recall that K1 1 is the total stock of capital at the beginning of period t+ 1. All of this
capital is held by generation t consumers and, furthermore, this is the only asset held by these
consumers. Therefore, letting St denote the saving of a representative generation t consumer, it
follows that Kt+ 1 = N1 st which can be written as
flkt=
St (14)
Ratherthan determine the saving of a generation t consumer as the solution to an
infinite—horizon maximization problem, I will follow WeiFs approach and ask the following
question How much would a generation 1 consumer save if he earns a wege income wt, receives
a bequest bt_i from his parent, receives gifts totalling ng1 from his n children, earns a rate
of return R1÷ i , and, in addition, if he is arbitrarily required to leave a bequest of bt to each of
his children and to give a gift of g1 to his parent? Although I cannot answer this question
explicitly at this level of generality, the saving function will have the following form
s1 = s(bt_i wt , n(g1÷1 —bt)Rt+i) (15)
The saving function in (1 5) depends on first-period income, second-period income, and the
rate of return to saving. Under the assumption that cit and c211 are both normal goods,
s(.,.,.) is increasing in its first argument and is decreasing in its second argument. Substituting
the competitive factor prices (1 0, 11) into (1 5), then substituting the resulting expression
into (1 4) and restricting attention to the steady state yields
h(k,b-g)s(b—g+w(k), n(g-b), R(k)) - nk = 0 (16)
We follow Diamond (1 965) and confine attention to locally stable steady states (i.e., steady
states for which hk c 0). To avoid any complications which matj arise from multiple locally10
stable steady states, I follow Well and assume that there is a unique locallystablesteady state.
Let k = k*(z) be the steady state capital labor ratio when b — g = z.
As a point of reference, consider the steady state of the Dmrnond (1 965) economy in which
consumers have neither a bequest motive nor a gift motwe. Let k0 denote the steady state
capital- labor ratio in the Diamond economy. Because b = g = 0 in the Diamond economy, it
follows that
kD = k*(0) (17)
Recall that the saving function s( , , ) is increasing in its first argument and is decreasing in
its second argument. Therefore, it follows from the definition of h(k, z) in (1 6) that h(k, z)
0 and hence k*(z) isan increasing function of ) 5 Because k(z) >0 and R(k) <0, equation
(17) implies that
> >
b-g-0 OSkkD CSR_RD (18)
>
I now present simple conditions which are sufficient for each type of transfer motive to be
operative. Essentially, in order for a transfer motive to be operative, it must be sufficiently
strong. Proposition 1 , which provides a sufficient condition for operative bequests, is due to
Weil( 1 987); Proposition 2, which provides a sufficient condition for operative gifts, is new.
Proposition 1. If> n/RD, thenb>0.
Proof: If > n/RD, then (12) implies that P0 > n/ P. Therefore, (18) implies that b-g>
0, which along with the non- negativity constraint on g, implies that b> 0. q.e.d.
Proposition 2. Ifa>RD,theng>0.11
Proof: ft a > RE', then (1 2) rnphes that pDcx ￿ P. Therefore, (I 8) impliesthatb-g < 0,
which along with the non- negativity constraint on b, implies that g) 0. q.e.d.
If both transfer motives are sufficiently weak, then there will be no transfers in either
direction. Precise conditions are given by
Preposition 3. If ￿ n/ RE', Ci ￿ RD, j < ,,, then b = g = 0.
Proof (by contradiction): Suppose that b> 0 so that (1 3a) implies that P = n/ ￿ RD.
Therefore, (18) implies that b-g ￿ 0 which implies that g> 0. However, if g> 0, then (1 3b)
implies that P = a which contradicts the statements above that P = n/ end o < n. Therefore, b
= 0. A similar line of argument proves that g=0. q.e.d.
Finally, we consider the case in which o = n, which corresponds to the case considered by
Burbidge)6 In general, it is possible for there to be both positive gifts and positive bequests in
the steulj state. Nevertheless, one can determine whether the net flow of intergenerational
transfers is from parents to chuck-en (b-g> 0), from chuck-en to parents (b-g < 0), or zero.
Proposition 4. If a( = n, then b-g - 0 asRD - n/p = a.
Proof: Supposethot RD> n/a. It followsfrom (12) that RE'> Rwhich ,eccordingto(18),
implies that b-g> 0. Similarly, RD <cx implies that RD < R which, according to (18) implies
that b-g c 0. Finally, RD = n/ = a implies that RD = R which implies that b-g = 0. q.e.d.
The results concerning when the transfer motives will be operative are summarized in
Figures 1 end 2. The distinction between Figures 1 and 2 is that the utility function u(.,.) and
the prockiction function f( ) are such that the steady state of the Diamond economy is efficient in
Figure 1 but is inefficient in Figure 2. If the Diamond economy is efficient, then Figure 1
indicates that either the gift motive or the bequest motive could be operative; if neither motiveFigure 1 - Diamond steady state is efficient











is sufficiently strong, then neither motive will be operative. If the Diamondeconomy is
inefficient, then Figure 2 indicates that, for admissable values of , the bequest motive cannot be
operative, which is consistent with Wails (1 987) results. However, the gift motivecan be
operative if it is sufficiently strong. Again, if neither motive is sufficiently strong, then
neither will be operative.
The conditions for operative transfer motives are stated in terms of R0, thesteady state
interest rate in the Diamond model, It was Weils insight to recognize that the RDprovides a
useful summary of the utility function u(, ) and the production function f( ) for determining
whether a transfer motive will be operative. Nevertheless, it would be useful tostate the
conditions for operative bequests in terms of underlying preferences andtechnology. As a step
toward this goal, I will relate pD to consumer behavior expressed in terms of theaverage
propensity to consume and to the production function expressed in terms of the capital share of
income. Then, for a specific example I will express RD directly in terms of theparameters of
preferences and technology.
Let Cit denote st/wt, the average propensity to save out ofwage income and let + denote the
capital share in income, Ptkt/yt. Because the production function is assumed to belinearly
homogeneous, the labor share in income, wt /is equal to I - +t so that
wt =E(1-$t)/$tJRtkt (19)
It follows from (1 9) and the definition of theaverage propensity to save, Cii, that
St =E(l-$t)/+tiRtkt (20)
Equating the left hand side of (1 4) to the right hand side of (20) in the steady state of the
Diamond economy yields
nkD = Ci((1-$)/$] RDICD (21)
It follows immediately from (21 ) that
RD =n$/[Ci(1-4)J (22)
It follows from (22) that in the Diamondeconomy, the steady state interest rate tends to be13
large when either the capital share in income, 4, is large or the average propensity to save, 6, iS
small. Of course, the capital share, 4, and the average propensity to save, 6, are, in general,
endogenously determined. However, there is a special case in which both 4 and 6 are exogenous
parameters. tf the utility function is logarithmic, u(c1 u c21.. 1 (1 -6)ln Cit + i fri C2t+ 1'
0 <o < 1 , then the average propensity to save out of wage income is constant and equal to 6. If the
production function is Cobb-Douglas, f(k)Ak,0 ' 4 < 1 and A > 0, then the capital share in
income is constant and equal to4. In this special case, the expression for RD on the right hand
side of (22) is simply a function of the parameters of preferences and technology. Substutiting
this expression for RD in Propositions 1 - '1 delivers, for this example, a complete
characterization, in terms of the parameters of preferences and technology, of situations in
which the transfer motives will be operative or inoperative.
V. Concludina Remarks
The effects of changes in the timing of lump-sum taxes depend crucially on whether the
motives for intergenerational transfers are operative. In this paper I have derived conditions
which determine whether the bequest motive is operative, the gift motive is operative or neither
motive is operative. When neither motive is operative, then changes in the timing of
lump—sum taxes affect the intertemporal and intergenerational allocation of resources.
The formal results presented in Propositions 1 -4 and summarized in figures 1 and 2 apply
only to the steady state of a representative consumer economy. Future research should be
devoted to extending the analysis to the transition path outside the steady state and should analyze
economies with interesting heterogeneity. The reason for extending the analysis to the
transition path is that the Ricardien Equivalence Theorem requires that all consumers in all
generations be linked by operative intergenerational transfer motives. If some generation has
no operative intergenerational transfer motive, then at least some changes in the timing of
lump—sum taxes will affect the intertempor& allocation of resources. The magnitude of the14
effectwould depend on, among other things,theextent and sort of heterogeneity among
consumers. For example, heterogeneity with respect to initial wealth or labor income may lead
to a situation in which some consumers have operative bequest motives while otherconsumers
in their cohort face binding constraints. In this situation, the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem
would not hold; the extent of the departure from the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem,i.e., the
magnitude of the effect of fiscal policy, would depend on the proportion of consumers who face
binding constraints. In a subsequent paper, Abel (1 986) I have begun to explore some of these
issues. However, the model in that paper is restricted to Cobb—Douglas technology, logarithmic
utility with a bequest motive but no gift motive, and the heterogeneity is restricted to initial
wealth. tn addition to analyzing more general utility and production functions, future research
should analyze the effects of fiscal policy in the presence of heterogeneous laborproductivity,
secular productivity growth and two-sided transfer motives.
An additional avenue for future research is to analyze bequest and gift behavior undermore
general forms of intergenerational transfer motives. Bernheim (1 987) has argued that there is
no reason to insist on Jnemic consistency in modelling the consumption and transfer behavior
of families. Recently, Rag (1 987) has examined specifications of intergenerational altruism in
which a consumer obtains utility from the utility of many subsequent generations in hisfamily,
in addition to obtaining utility directly from his own consumption. If, for example, aconsumer
cares about his gran&hildren's utility in addition to his childrens utility and his own
consumption, then, in general, the consumption decisions of different generations within the
family will display dynamic inconsistency. In addition, Ray has shown that under this sort of
altruistic utility function, it is possible for the steady state to be characterized by positive
bequests end a dynamically inefficient overaccumulaton of capital. The determination of
conditions for the bequest motive to be operative or inoperative remains anopen question in this
more general framework.15
Footnotes
*Depertment ofFinance, WhartonSchool oftheUniversity ofPennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA
1 9104-6367.Previous versions ofthispaperwere written while t wasan Associate Professor
atHarvardUniversity.I thank B. Douglas Bernheirn, Olivier Blanchard, Stanley Fischer,Miles
Kimball, Lawrence Summers, John TaylorandPhilippe WeB forhelpfuldiscussions. Financial
supportfromthe Amoco Foundation TermProfessorhipinFinance, the National Science
Foundationandthe Sloan Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.
1. See Drazen(1 978), WeiKi 987), Cukierman(1 986), Cukierman and Meltzer(1 986),
Feldstein(1 986) and Abel(1 986).
2. Recently, Kimball (1 986) has extended the analysis in this paper to analyze the conditions
underwhichthere willbe an operative bequest motive under two-sided altruism.
3. As pointed out by Carmichael, in order for the Ricardian Equivalence to hold, the same
transfer motive must be operative both before and after the change in fiscal policy.
4. See Abel (1985), Kotlikoff, Shoven andSpivak(1 984), andlomes(1 981).
5. See, for example, Fischer(1 973), Friedman and Warshawsky(1 984).
6. See, for example, Buiter(1 979), Buiter and Carmichael (1 984), Carmichae)(1 982),
Burbidge(1 983,1 984), Weil(1 987).
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expectations of future gifts, Hon and Tsukamoto (1 985) analyze the case in which a> 1 as well
asthecase in whicha< 1.
9. Gale (1 983) has pointed out that there is an infinity of infinite—horizon utility functions
which are consistent with the recursive formulation in (2). By starting with equation (1) as
the specification of preferences, I am explicitly choosing one solution, a practice which is
followed, at least implicitly, in an overwhelming majority of the literature.
10. The relation between the utility function in (1) and "two—sided altruism" is discussed in
Kimball (1 986).
11. Bernheim and Bagwell (1 984) have recently provided a stimulating analysis of the
implications of marriage and altruism for the efficacy of fiscal policy.
1 2. This point has not been appreciated in the gift motive literature. In fairness to Carmichael,
it must be noted that he seemed to be aware of this point and avoided its implications by treating
the "descendents and forebearers as though there were only one of each; the descendent will be n
times 'bigger,' and the forebear-er n times 'smaller' than the individual." (1 979, fn 2).
Subsequently, Buiter end Carmichael (1 984, p. 763, In. 2) recognized that each consumer has17
one, rather than 1 /n,(set of) parent(s). Thej use thisobservation to make an insightful
comment on Burbidg&s specification of the utilitg function, but thej ignore this observation in
deriving optimal individual behavior under the Nash assumption.
1 3. The assumption that the marginal utilitj of consumption at each age becomes infinite as the
level of consumption approaches zero implies that anj non— negativity constraints on
consumption willnotbe binding.
1 4. Actuelly Burbidge departed from the Nash assumption in determining an individual
consumers optimal gift and thus arrived at the analogue of (6) rather than (6).Under this
assumption, the boundarj of the a&nissable region of parmater values is a3 = 1 rather than c43 =
n. Adjusting Burbidge's analjsis to incorporate the Nash assumption wouldamend his
assumption to o = n.
1 5. Formalig, h(k*(z), z) 0 which implies that k*'(z) = — hz/hk > 0.
16. Seefootnotel4.References
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